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Abstract
We approach the philosophy of mathematics via an analysis of mathe-
matics as it is practised. This leads us to a classification in terms of four
concepts, which we define and illustrate with a variety of examples. We call
these concepts background conventions, context, content, and intuition.
1 Introduction
Mathematics has been subjected to such intense scrutiny over many years that
it now needs whole books to describe the variety of philosophical positions which
can be taken towards its foundations. In spite of this there is no agreement even
about whether one should adopt a broadly realist (Platonic) or anti-realist position
towards its basic entities. Go¨del’s theorem is accepted as mathematically correct
but its interpretation – whether it establishes that proof and truth are distinct –
divides the philosophical community. Some think that the truth of Peano arith-
metic is self-evident while others consider that we are forced to accept it by the
nature of our intelligence.
In this paper we by-pass these problems temporarily, and describe mathematics as
it is actually practised. We provide an analysis in terms of four concepts, back-
ground conventions, context, content, and intuition, and describe the relationship
between these. We consider that our analysis provides a richer view of the subject
than the usual approaches, and even that it demonstrates the irrelevance of some
of the existing controversies about the subject.
We reiterate the comments of Lakatos [1976] that philosophers’ concentration on
foundations does not provide a true picture of the subject. Most mathematicians
may not have much more understanding of the philosophy of their subject than
crane drivers do of Newtonian mechanics, but, nevertheless, mathematics is, by
1
definition, what they do, not the tiny part of it which most philosophers find inter-
esting. It is surely significant that Newton, and then Laplace, were able to calculate
planetary motions with extraordinary accuracy long before the real numbers were
rigorously defined. Their results needed no changes as a result of the foundational
‘revolution’ at the start of the twentieth century.
Focussing on the formal aspects of arithmetic or logic to the exclusion of every-
thing else in mathematics is similar to regarding grammar as being the basis of
spoken communications, as opposed to ideas. It is worth recalling that classical
Greek geometry was highly sophisticated and preceded the formulation of Peano’s
axioms by over 2000 years. The Greek and later Arabic study of polynomial equa-
tions culminated in Cardan’s complete solution of cubic equations using complex
numbers in 1539. Even this preceded the first statement of the law of induction, by
Maurolico in 1575. The contention that counting and the abstract law of induction
are the most basic ingredients of mathematics does not stand historical scrutiny.
Before starting our description of mathematics, we need to address some matters
of terminology. We will often avoid using the term ‘realism’, because it means
various things to different people. Platonism is now often called realism, although
it is quite different from scientific realism; it is also occasionally called idealism.
With some justification Popper claimed that his World 3 objects are real, because
they affect human behaviour and through them other material bodies. He empha-
sised that after their conception World 3 objects are much more than just ideas
– they exist in their own right and have objective properties. He gave the exam-
ple of Frege’s set theory, which was, he wrote in Popper [1977, p.57], inconsistent
before Russell discovered that fact. Bishop [1967, p.10] also calls his own position
straightforward realism, but we will call it constructivism. We call our position
contextualism, with the risk of creating new confusions, since this term is already
used in the philosophical literature. Contextualism in mathematics should not be
confused with scientific relativism. Science is the study of the external world, while
mathematics is one of the ways we systematize our thoughts. It is hardly surpris-
ing that our ability to think carefully is helpful when we are trying to understand
the world, but our thought processes and the external world are quite different.
Philosophical beliefs about the two need not be related.
2 Definitions
It is tempting to start by discussing the difference between syntax and semantics
in mathematics, but we defer that. We actually start by defining the concept of
context. By this we will mean the assumptions, axioms and definitions relevant
to a particular field of mathematics. These may often be divided into two groups,
mathematical assumptions and logical rules, but if the subject itself is formal logic
the two cannot be distinguished.
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Let us consider constructive mathematics as developed in Bishop [1967]. In this
field one accepts Peano arithmetic, but not the law of the excluded middle. Bishop
allowed iterative constructions, for example of the real number system, but re-
quired that limiting procedures should be under quantitative control. He had def-
inite philosophical reasons for proposing this system, which he regarded as more
cogent than classical mathematics, but these will be discussed in Section 4. All
we need say here is that constructive mathematics has different theorems from
classical mathematics, and, even when the theorems appear similar, the proofs are
often different and have greater constructive content. In constructive mathemat-
ics the intermediate value theorem cannot be proved. The notion of compactness
must be formulated with much more care than in classical mathematics, but the
constructive version is still very powerful. Constructive mathematics and classical
mathematics inhabit different mathematical universes.
The background conventions of pure mathematics are the procedures by which
mathematicians agree that the proof of a theorem is correct subject to the assumed
context. If the context does not include the law of the excluded middle then
they must check that it is, indeed, not used in the proof being examined. If the
axiom of choice is not present in the context, it must again not be used. Similarly
for the parallel axiom if one is doing projective geometry, and for Robinson-type
infinitesimals is one is doing classical mathematics. When checking proofs for
correctness mathematicians use informal logical arguments. Each line of a proof is
determinately valid or invalid, and if each step is valid than the proof as a whole
is valid. The fact that true-false arguments are used to check proofs is entirely
separate from whether the particular context involves two-valued logic or allows a
decision procedure.
It is entirely possible to check proofs using a computer if they are written out in
a sufficiently formal manner. One then needs to be convinced that the program
does indeed formalize the methods that mathematicians use to check the correct-
ness of proofs, so human judgement is not eliminated, only pushed back a stage.
In practice mathematicians agree about what constitute correct proofs within a
context. Disagreements often arise from the fact that the steps of most proofs are
very informal, and may need to be expanded in order to confirm their correctness.
Human beings are very poor at checking formal proofs, but in practice this does
not seem to be a serious impediment to consensus.
Our third concept is content. This means the theorems, both individually and
collectively as a theory, which have been proved in a particular context. When
mathematicians say that a theorem is true they mean that they have read and
understood the proof, or that they trust others to have done so. When they say
that it is false they mean that they know of a counterexample, know that assuming
its truth leads to a contradiction, or are confident that within a short space of time
they could provide one of these. In other circumstances they say that they do not
know. In other words they talk in entirely epistemological terms. They may have
private views about the ontology of their subject, but this is irrelevant to their
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professional interactions. They may also believe that a proof of some theorem will
eventually be found, but beliefs are not publishable as mathematics, although they
are occasionally allowed in academic journals as concessions to the authors.
Our final concept is intuition. This provides guidance about what types of theo-
rem are likely to be provable within a particular context. It is hard to communicate
in writing because of its very personal nature, and little evidence of its key role
is to be found in articles in journals. This is not the place to describe the wide
variety of intuitions. They are frequently highly geometrical, but may be purely
syntactical, as for example when seeing a pattern in the coefficients of
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1− x+ x2 = 1 + x− x
3 − x4 + x6 + x7 − ...
See Henley [1995], Lakatos [1976] and Polya [1954] for discussions of this and
other examples. Intuitions may also be based upon seeing the possibility of useful
analogies, as between the commutator formula
[A,BC] = [A,B]C +B[A,C]
for matrices and Leibniz’s rule
(fg)′(x) = f ′(x)g(x) + f(x)g′(x).
The similarity is again purely algebraic.
Some mathematicians have much better intuitions than others, but most remember
occasions on which their intuitions have let them down, i.e. led them to think that
a theorem was true when it was actually false (or vice versa). Such occasions may
be resolved in one of two ways. The mathematician may modify his intuition, often
quite a painful process. Alternatively he may alter the context of his theory, by
changing some of the axioms or definitions. There is a closed loop in which the
discovery of new content can change the intuition, the new intuition can lead to
alterations of the context, while the context controls the content. None of these
dominates. Indeed pure mathematics might be said to consist of the discovery or
invention of such closed loops. Their interest is judged on the basis of their novelty
and technical non-triviality.
An example of this was the formal definition of the real number system by Weier-
strass and others. To the dismay of the inventors it turned out that their definition
led to the conclusion that there existed continuous functions which were nowhere
differentiable. They regarded such pathologies as very distasteful, but decided to
accept the consequences of their own definitions and modify their intuitions rather
than the definition of the real number system (the context of their theory). A hun-
dred years later their approach is so ingrained in the way we teach analysis that it
is difficult to understand why they had this problem. Indeed the nineteenth cen-
tury nightmare of nowhere differentiable functions became the twentieth century
heaven of self-similar sets and fractal dimensions.
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We next clarify our position with respect to the two main questions of Tennant
[1997, p.159]. On the first (could there be recognition transcendent truths?) we
can be agnostic. The job of mathematicians is to provide proofs of those things
which can be proved, and to classify those things which can be classified. To the
second (is truth determinately bivalent?) we give a positive answer with respect
to the verification of proofs using the background conventions of mathematics, in
the sense defined above. Whether or not truth is bivalent for statements within a
particular theory depends upon the context. In classical mathematics it is and in
constructive mathematics it is not.
We now turn to the promised discussion of syntax versus semantics. Clearly the
background conventions used to check proofs should be called syntax, while intu-
ition lies in the semantic category. If one looks only at a completed theory it is easy
to conclude that mathematics is entirely syntax. One sees only axioms, definitions
and proofs of theorems. These are almost never written down in a completely
formal manner, but the belief is that they could be. If one identifies mathematics
with the final product of mathematical endeavours, one might well call oneself a
formalist in the sense of Hilbert. However, mathematics is a goal-directed activity,
and the context is set by the action of human intuitions. The definitions may be
adjusted several times while the theory is being constructed, so the appearance
of the final product is misleading. The more experienced a mathematician, the
greater the extent to which he is able to skim through a proof looking for the
ideas, only returning to check the details once he is sure that he understands the
overall strategy. Usually this aspect is the main element of conversations between
mathematicians. Linear reading of a text is reserved for situations in which one has
so little understanding of a new field that nothing else is possible. From the lofty
perspective of the experienced mathematician, a theory is defined by its intuitions,
and the formal aspects are mere details.
In the next two sections we discuss the weaknesses of classical mathematics and
the strengths of constructive mathematics. We pass by the strengths of classical
mathematics and the limitations of constructive mathematics, because these are
much better known.
3 Problems with Classical Mathematics
The pluralist approach to mathematics described above contrasts with the assertion
by Maddy [1997, p. 191] that mathematicians have decided in favour of classical
mathematics. For a very small number of mathematicians this means ZFC, but
for most it means anything which may be proved using Peano arithmetic, naive
set theory, the axiom of choice, and a naive notion of truth which implies the law
of the excluded middle.
Go¨del epitomized this view. He described himself as a Platonist, and considered
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that sets had an objective existence. His own theorems proved the deficiencies
of formal mathematical reasoning rather than the failure of certain statements to
have any truth value. For Go¨del ZFC was a partial list of properties of an external
Platonic reality. He was confident that the continuum hypothesis was either true
or false, because it referred to entities which either existed or did not.
The shaky philosophical foundations of classical mathematics were clear from its
inception. There was a vigorous debate early in the twentieth century over the
acceptability of the axiom of choice. Even its inventor, Zermelo, eventually agreed
that the most compelling reason to accept it was the fact that without it math-
ematicians could not prove large numbers of results which they needed (Maddy
[1997, p. 56]). They accepted it for pragmatic reasons, hoping that a justification
would later appear. Now we know that there can be no proof of the axiom, but
it seems that many mathematicians regard it as being so obvious that it needs no
serious discussion. Cohen [1966], the person who finally proved that the continuum
hypothesis was independent of ZFC, disagreed.
Historically, mathematics does not seem to enjoy tolerating undecid-
able propositions. It may elevate such a proposition to the status of
an axiom, and through repeated exposure it may become quite widely
accepted. This is more or less the case with the Axiom of Choice. I
would characterize this tendency quite simply as opportunism. It is of
course an impersonal and quite constructive opportunism. Neverthe-
less, the feeling that mathematics is a worthwhile and relevant activity
should not completely erase in our minds an honest appreciation of the
problems which beset us. (Cohen [1971])
The paradoxical consequences of accepting the ‘truth’ of classical mathematics
have become clearer as time has passed. Very recently Friedman has discovered a
series of straightforward finite theorems in mathematics which can only be proved
on the assumption that certain very large cardinals exist. One can take several
philosophical attitudes towards this mathematical result, but the author himself
wrote that his
findings raise the specific issue of what constitutes a valid mathematical
proof and the general issue of objectivity in mathematics in a down to
earth way. (Friedman [1988])
In our language he was questioning the context, not the content, of his results: there
is little doubt that his proofs are valid in the limited sense that the steps follow as
he claims under the hypotheses and rules of inference which he adopts. The issue
is whether his theorems are so counter to intuition that they demand a revision
of the context of the proofs. This could, of course, go in several directions, but
Friedman expects that the use of new axioms in mathematics will steadily increase
as time passes. Those who regard large cardinals as outside the framework of
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acceptable mathematics may be persuaded by his results to adopt a non-realist, or
non-bivalent, view of mathematical truth.
At the present time most mathematicians work within classical mathematics. How-
ever, the number who are prepared to consider alternatives is increasing, possibly
because of the influence of computers on the development of mathematics. Ques-
tions of computational complexity have greater importance than they used to, and
force one to concentrate on methods of proof rather than abstract truth. The hey-
day of abstract, classical mathematics was in the 1960s, but the current tendency
is to concentrate more on the classification of mathematical entities such as finite
simple groups and 3-manifolds.
We remark in passing that Markov [1958] has proved that the homeomorphism
problem for closed 4-manifolds is algorithmically insoluble: it may be reduced
to the word problem for groups and then to Turing’s halting problem. This has
caused mathematicians to switch their attention to sub-classes of 4-manifolds for
which progress may be possible. Their response to Markov’s result has been purely
pragmatic, in line with my comment above that their job is proving theorems, not
grieving over theorems which cannot be proved.
Our final example of the paradoxical consequences of accepting classical mathe-
matics is taken from Ruelle [1993, p. 148], but originates from Go¨del himself. It is
worth repeating because it illustrates the issues involved in this debate particularly
clearly. The story has to be told in the language of a classical Platonist.
Given a Turing machine and a natural number n, one can consider the finite set of
programs of length up to n. When put into the machine each program terminates
in a finite length of time or continues for ever. Let T (n) denote the maximum
running time of those programs which do terminate. If there existed an algorithm
for computing the function T (·) then there would be a decision procedure for the
Halting problem: given a program of length n let it run until time T (n) + 1 and,
if it has not halted, it never will.
The question is whether the function T (·) should be regarded as existing. A Pla-
tonist will answer yes, because he considers that the meaning of the definition is
clear. An constructivist will answer no because its existence makes no contact with
anything which could be useful: we know, thanks to Go¨del and Turing, that T (·) is
not computable, so its existence has no significance for us. The existence of T (·) is
an elementary consequence of the assumption that every meaningful mathematical
statement (in this case that every program either halts or does not halt in a finite
but unspecified length of time) has a determinate value independent of our being
able to know it.
Those who insist that the function T (·) exists have to admit that it increases with
unimaginable rapidity. If it were bounded above by 2∧(2∧(2∧(2n))) or any other
computable function, then by using that function in place of T (·) above one would
have produced a decision procedure for the Halting problem.
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4 In Support of Constructive Mathematics
There are many theorems in mathematical analysis whose proof depends upon
some form of the axiom of choice. One of these is the Hahn-Banach theorem. This
is the statement that if L is a closed linear subspace of a Banach space B and
φ is a bounded linear functional on L, then φ may be extended without increase
of norm to B. The standard proof depends upon using Zorn’s lemma to ‘find’ a
maximal extension of φ with the required properties, and then using a further one-
step extension procedure to prove that this maximal extension already has domain
equal to B.
If one assumes that B is separable, then there is an alternative and more construc-
tive approach. One can apply the one-step construction iteratively, at each step
including one more element from the countable dense set which is provided. After
a countable number of steps the functional has been extended to a dense subspace
of B, and one can apply a completion procedure.
This proof is not incapable of being criticised, in that it supposes that a countable
number of successive steps can be completed, but it is much more constructive than
the general proof. Many mathematicians consider that the classical proof is better
than the constructive one, on the grounds that it applies in greater generality. We
next suggest that this extra power is to some degree spurious.
One of the major applications of the Hahn-Banach theorem is to prove that every
Banach space B has a Banach dual space B∗ with various properties. The precise
structure of B∗ is of great importance, and has been determined for a large number
of Banach spaces. Almost all of the spaces B for which the dual space can be de-
scribed explicitly are separable. Two of the most important non-separable Banach
spaces are L∞(X, dx), the space of essentially bounded functions on a measure
space, and M(Ω), the space of signed measures on a compact Hausdorff space Ω.
In addition the entire theory of von Neumann algebras deals with non-separable
Banach spaces. In all these cases the description of the dual space is extremely
abstract, and involves discussions in set theory which leave most mathematicians
cold (but not all; see Kaplan [1985]). In particular the Banach dual space of l∞(Z)
has a description in terms of the very abstract Stone-Cˇech compactification of the
integers.
As our second example we consider the intermediate value theorem for continuous
functions of a single real variable. The standard proof of this theorem depends
upon using the ‘fact’ that every bounded set of real numbers has a least upper
bound. Bishop [1967, p. 5] provides compelling evidence that the intermediate
value theorem is not valid in a constructive context. In classical terms the value
of the variable x for which f(x) = c exists, but there is no general algorithm for
determining it from the function.
The classically trained mathematician does not regard this as disturbing, because
for him existence has a Platonic meaning independent of computability. Bishop
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took a very different line. Bishop [1967] followed Kronecker and Poincare´ in holding
that integer arithmetic was forced on us by the nature of our intelligence, but also
considered that the law of the excluded middle should not be used, . He argued
that humans should not concern themselves with the parts of mathematics which
are in God’s domain: as finite beings we should study problems which we can solve
using procedures which we can control. He performed the very valuable service of
proving, by doing it, that mathematics was not fatally weakened by taking this
stance. Previously most mathematicians, observing Brouwer’s failed advocacy of
the same idea, had believed that avoiding the law of the excluded middle imposed
unacceptable penalties.
However, Bishop’s philosophy was not well worked out, and one does not need to
buy into it totally in order to benefit from what he achieved (see Billinge [2003]).
We can think of the difference between the two systems as depending upon different
interpretations of the quantifier ∃. Its interpretation is classified under the heading
of intuition, and should be distinguished from the rules governing its use, which
are a part of the context of a theory. In classical mathematics ∃ refers to Platonic
existence, but intuitionists consider that it should only be used to refer to the
possibility of constructing the relevant quantity. At the formal level the difference
between the two positions is that in classical mathematics ∃ may be defined in
terms of ∀: the expression ∃xA is logically equivalent to ¬(∀a¬A). In intuitionist
mathematics ∃ is a new quantifier with stricter conditions for its application.
The fact that most pure mathematicians are Platonists is not a substantial argu-
ment in favour of that position. Very few of them have thought seriously about
the issues. Most are simply adopting the simplest interpretation of what they are
doing, because they are not really interested in philosophical questions, and want
to spend their time proving theorems. Human beings are notoriously bad at under-
standing their thought processes, and routinely assume that their mental models
of reality are ‘obviously’ right, in spite of the fact that others find quite different
beliefs equally obvious.
If one considers that mathematics is the creation of the human mind, one does not
need to accept or reject either of the above interpretations of ∃. In the appropriate
context each may be more fruitful than the other. Constructive proofs may be more
limited in scope and harder to complete, but they provide more information. Their
absence indicates that quantitative solutions of certain problems are not possible
without further conditions. Nor is there any scientific need to take a position on the
‘correct’ meaning of the quantifier ∃ in mathematics. One can simply remember
which theorems depend on which axioms, so that one is prepared for whatever
one may encounter in the future. Any other attitude indicates either laziness or
quasi-religious commitment.
A possible argument in favour of the classical interpretation of ∃ is that it has
a wider scope than the constructive interpretation, and the more inclusive defi-
nition is necessarily the better. The weakness of this position is best illustrated
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by considering the following example, one of many I could have chosen, in which
fruitfulness has been judged more important than generality.
Functional analysis and operator theory can be developed in the context of Hilbert
spaces, Banach spaces or even locally convex topological vector spaces. Each of
these involves a system of axioms which is more general than the previous one
in the list. One observes that the theory of LCTVS’s has stagnated since its
heyday in the 1950s, because most applications can be treated more satisfactorily
in the other, more concrete, frameworks. From the point of view of the richness
of the theories the order is reversed: Hilbert space operator theory has the richest
structure, partly because of its large group of symmetries (unitary operators).
One can hardly deny that the notion of fruitfulness has been of major importance
in the survival of axiom systems. Fruitfulness involves value judgements, and shows
that mathematicians are involved in the same type of human enterprise as the rest
of the human race. The historical importance of fruitfulness in the development
of mathematics has been explored in some depth by Maddy [1997]. Unfortunately
she makes no reference, positively or negatively, to the work of Bishop, Nelson,
Parikh or Robinson, and comes to the conclusion that ‘history shows that such an
opponent (of the axiom of choice) would be swimming against the tide’ (Maddy
[1997, pp. 56]). She also asserts that history shows that mathematicians have
dismissed the constructivist movement (Maddy [1997, p.191]). Perhaps one might
suggest that the sea of knowledge can have many tides, each capable of being
enjoyed by different members of the same community.
5 Avoiding Unnecessary Philosophical Choices
Mathematical pluralism states that different types of mathematics can co-exist.
Several mathematicians have made important contributions in two mutually in-
consistent contexts. For example, Bishop was a pioneer in constructive analysis,
but prior to that he had done important work in the theory of sup-norm alge-
bras, a subject intermediate between functional and complex analysis. Nelson did
important work on finite arithmetic, but he had previously had key insights in
probability and quantum field theory. (I am not attempting to summarize their
life’s work.)
However, both Bishop and Nelson developed strong views about the ‘philosophi-
cally correct context’ for mathematics. In ‘Predicative Arithmetic’ Nelson wrote
What is at issue here is not the familiar construct of formal mathemat-
ics, but a belief in the existence of ω (the set of natural numbers) prior
to all mathematical constructions. What is the origin of this belief?
The famous saying by Kronecker that God created the numbers, all
the rest is the work of Man, presumably was not meant to be taken
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seriously. Nowhere in the Book of Genesis do we find the passage: And
God said, let there be numbers, and there were numbers; odd and even
created he them, and he said unto them be fruitful and multiply; and
he commanded them to keep the laws of induction. No, the belief in
ω stems from the speculations of Greek philosophy on the existence
of ideal entities or the speculations of German philosophy on a priori
categories of thought. (Nelson [1986, p. 80])
In spite of the above there is now a new generation of mathematicians who are will-
ing to accept the value of all of these variations from the classical scheme. One can
identify three strands of opinion about this. The first is that classical mathematics
is the final arbiter of truth, but constructive methods are sometimes pragmatically
useful because they provide more information. In this view constructive mathe-
matics is simply a convenient formalization of the constructive approach, and has
no foundational significance.
The second view is that constructive mathematics is the real thing, but that it
may sometimes be helpful to use classical mathematics to provide intuition about
what might be proved within constructive mathematics. Since classical mathemat-
ics is an extension of constructive mathematics, any theorem proved in classical
mathematics will (almost surely) not be disproved in constructive mathematics.
The pluralist attitude, which is the one proposed in this paper, is that one need
not make such philosophical choices. One should simply accept each mathematical
theory on its merits, and judge it according to the non-triviality and interest of the
results proved within it. According to Schechter, this is increasingly the attitude
which logicians take towards their subject.
The “existence” of f – or of any mathematical object, even the number
“3” – is purely formal. It does not have the same kind of solidity
as your table and your chair; it merely exists in the mental universe
of mathematics. Many different mathematical universes are possible.
When we accept or reject the Axiom of Choice, we are specifying which
universe we shall work in. Both possibilities are feasible... (Schechter
[2004])
The first two groups of mathematicians may be identified as Platonists and con-
structivists respectively. One still has to ask whether the pluralist view is philo-
sophically coherent. One might regard mathematicians who adopt it as anti-realists
in practice, whatever they say, because their willingness to contemplate mathemat-
ics with the continuum hypothesis or axiom of choice one day and without them
the next shows that they do not have any deep beliefs about the existence of the
relevant entities.
It is also possible to argue that a pluralist is a realist in denial, because in the last
resort he accepts that the correctness of proofs is judged using two-valued classical
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logic. Each step is determinately valid or invalid, and the proof is valid if and only
if each step is valid. Note that one cannot correctly replace the word ‘validity’ by
‘truth’ in the above sentence. One might say that it is true that the proof is valid
if and only if it is indeed valid, but this is inconsequential, because it contains no
new content. The notion of validity used when checking proofs is very basic, and
certainly does not involve any commitment to the law of induction. It is arguable
whether it even implies the ability to count, although it does depend upon the
ability to recognize the order in which a string of symbols is placed on a line.
Both of the above criticisms of contextualism result from attempts to force it into
frameworks which do not fit it. There is an analogy with competitive games. If
someone plays bridge one evening and chess the next, he could justifiably assert
that both are valid ways of engaging his intellect, and that he feels richer for
appreciating the subtleties of both. They have many things in common – the fact
that the players take turns, follow specified rules and try to beat their opponents
– but the two games do not need to compete for supremacy.
Mathematics is not the same as chess, because the goal in one field is to prove
theorems and in the other to beat one’s opponent. As World 3 objects, the fact
that theorems are human constructs does not rob them of objective validity (Popper
[1977]). Every chess player agrees about what is a checkmate for one player, just
as every mathematician agrees about what is a valid proof. These are objective
facts within the appropriate contexts.
Mathematicians do not need to commit themselves about the ‘right way’ of devel-
oping their subject. Indeed, they serve the scientific community best by providing
as wide a variety of different ways of developing the subject as possible, in the
hope that some will prove useful in the future. Perhaps Peano arithmetic will one
day be regarded as much less interesting than finite arithmetic by generations who
are far more deeply involved in computational issues. Perhaps twentieth century
discussions about the continuum hypothesis will one day be regarded as totally
misguided, similar in nature to discussions about how many angels can dance on
the head of a pin. Or possibly future generations will decide to accept it as an
indispensable part of mathematics, although unprovable. This would not make it
true, any more than the laws of of Scotland are true.
6 Varieties of Arithmetic
A huge number of investigations of mathematical realism have tried, without suc-
cess, to reconcile two matters: people’s feeling that counting, and hence arithmetic,
are basic concepts which are not man-made; and the fact that there is no way of
explaining how we can know of them if they exist independently of the human
species. If our knowledge is obtained by applying reason, then the application
of that reason would lead us to the same conclusions even if they did not exist.
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We refer to Balaguer [1998] for a discussion of these issues and references to the
literature.
This controversy refuses to die. In a recent article Redhead has revived the claims
of Go¨del, Lucas and Penrose that human beings have powers denied to computers
(Redhead [2004]). He even claims that there is an elementary argument for this,
which does not rely upon the use of Go¨del’s theorems. In the preface to his article
he states that ‘as a result of the work of Go¨del and Tarski we know that truth
does not equate with proof’. He also holds that arithmetic is a formalization of
properties of the ‘intended model’, to which one can properly attach notions of
truth and falsity. The notion of truth is a very difficult one, and both of his
statements above are certainly controversial (Tennant [1997]).
Redhead’s gloss on Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is very close to the statement
of the theorem given in Manin [1977, p. 81] – that the set of ‘true formulas’ is
not equal to the set of ‘deducible formulas’. However, if one adopts an intuitionist
mind-set it is not difficult to find where the notion of truth is slipped into the book.
Most accounts of Go¨dels’ theorem follow his own paper in saying that within any
formalization of arithmetic there are simple propositions which are not decidable
from within the system.
Mendelson [1964, p.143,144] separates the statement of Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem from his discussion of true but unprovable results. He also refers to the
‘standard model’ of arithmetic, which he admits is regarded by some as too pre-
carious a basis for consistency proofs (Mendelson [1964, p. 107]). If one regards
Peano arithmetic as reached by a process of idealization from what we actually
experience when counting, one will certainly agree with this.
There are several different axiomatizations of arithmetic. Peano arithmetic comes
in at least three flavours. They use the same axioms, but differ in the logical
arguments which may be used. First order Peano arithmetic allows only a limited
range of predicates, second order Peano arithmetic allows far more, while Bishop’s
approach to the subject does not allow the use of the law of the excluded middle
(Bishop [1967]). These are different systems, allowing different theorems, and one is
not compelled to decide that one of them matches the ‘true nature’ of the counting
numbers better than the others.
There are other variations in the foundations of logic or mathematics which are
of interest, such as the so-called ‘finite arithmetic’ of Parikh [1971], developed by
a substantial number of other mathematicians, including Carbone [2000], Nelson
[1986] and Sazanov [1995]. This is a more radical departure from the usual axiom
systems, but it is of value in certain contexts, for example in relation to computa-
tional complexity. In this system exponentiation is avoided and numbers such as
1010
100
are considered infeasible.
The are several versions of finite arithmetic, but the underlying intuition is easily
conveyed using decimal arithmetic. This was invented by Hindu-Arabic mathe-
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maticians, and gradually diffused into Europe between 1000 AD and 1500 AD. Let
D100 denote the system of decimal arithmetic in which each number has no more
than a hundred digits, and with the standard rules for addition and multiplication.
(The number 100 may be increased of course.) Each decimal number is simply
defined as a string of digits, and one makes no commitment to the existence of the
set of all such numbers. Nor need one assume that ‘in principle’ one could count
from 1 up to 10100 if one were sufficiently determined. It is known that the law
of induction may be proved within D100 in a few pages, using only routine logic
and the law of substitution ([2003a]). Peano arithmetic is obtained by abstract-
ing, or idealising, the properties of this system, but by itself D100 goes far beyond
the needs of scientists, who cannot measure anything with greater than 15 digit
accuracy. In fact the only uses for numbers with 100 digits are in cryptography, in
which the connection with counting is irrelevant.
Another variation on classical mathematics is Robinson’s non-standard analysis,
which has had stochastic applications via the so-called Loeb measure construction
(see Cutland [1988], Robinson [1979]). Although a minority interest, it is genuine
mathematics which goes against the grain of the classical tradition by reviving the
notion of the infinitesimal, which everyone thought had been killed by Cauchy in
the 1820s. History has a habit of playing tricks on those who think that the ‘right
way’ of setting up the foundations of a subject can be settled once and for all, even
in mathematics.
At the other extreme from non-standard analysis is (rounded, floating point) inter-
val arithmetic. This has an ancient history, but is becoming slowly more important
in scientific computing, particularly in connection with computer assisted proofs
of theorems in analysis; see Markov and Okumura [1999], Moore [1979] and the
Interval Computations Web-Site [2004] for further details and some of the many
applications. Its basic entities are rather like real numbers, and may be written in
the form
x = 1.24706304296 e3
where one pre-assigns the number of significant digits allowed. The interpretation
of this expression is as the interval [x, x] where x = 1247.06296 and x = 1247.06304,
but the definitions of the basic operations of arithmetic on the entities do not
depend logically upon the intuition, nor upon any commitment to the existence of
the real number system. To add two entities one adds the lower bounds and then
rounds down to the prescribed number of digits, and also adds together the two
upper bounds and rounds up to the prescribed number of digits. One identifies an
integer n with the interval [n, n] and writes x ∼ y if the two intervals overlap, i.e.
if
max{x, y} ≤ min{x, y}.
One puts x > 0 if x > 0, and x < 0 if x < 0; if neither of these holds then x ∼ 0.
One might define pi in the system by pi ∼ 3.1415926543, without commitment to the
existence of an ‘exact’ value. In interval arithmetic
(x− 1)2 ∼ x2 − 2x+ 1
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but the two are not equal. One needs to choose the ‘right’ way of evaluating an
expression to minimize the width of the interval produced.
A systematic development of interval arithmetic has been completed, and program-
ming languages using it are readily available. There is very little written about it of
a philosophical character, but it could regarded as an alternative way of developing
mathematics which does not necessitate commitment to the existence of infinite
procedures. It is even possible to imagine it replacing standard real analysis at
some future time.
Apparently bizarre variations in logic can be surprisingly useful. An example of
this is paraconsistent logic, in which contradictions of the form (A and ¬A) do
not imply every other formula B (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [2004]).
Logics of this type can be useful when designing automated information processing
systems, in which a computer is presented with large amounts of data, not all of
which is correct or up to date. This may be the type of logic which humans use
in their everyday life, and this may in turn be why we are able to contemplate
different and mutually inconsistent logical systems without mental breakdown.
Nevertheless, most people would like assurances that their theorems or beliefs are
consistent. They accept Go¨dels’ proof that the consistency of arithmetic cannot
be proved, but some believe that it is nevertheless consistent, because of the ‘fact’
that it describes actual properties of the ‘expected interpretation’ or the ‘intended
model’. Referring to the ‘intended model’ begs the question. Its existence is simply
asserted without evidence, and therefore places one outside the scientific enterprise.
The phrase ‘expected interpretation’ is more psychological in tone, but one is forced
to comment that expectations do not always correspond to reality.
It seems to us entirely possible that Peano arithmetic is actually inconsistent. We
have no evidence of this, and do not claim that it is likely to be inconsistent, only
that it is possible. To support this idea we consider an example from group theory.
Consider the following list of axioms.
(1) G is the set of elements considered, and it is supposed that the elements obey
the group axioms.
(2) G is supposed to be finite but not isomorphic to any of the known list of finite
simple groups.
(3) G is supposed to be simple. In other words if N is a subset which has certain
list of properties (those of a normal subgroup other than the trivial subgroup) then
N = G.
These axioms can be compared to those of Peano arithmetic. The last is similar in
form to the induction axiom (or axiom schema in first order logic) in that it refers
to an unspecified set with certain properties, and concludes that it is equal to G
(we assume that one can switch back and forth between subsets and predicates).
Although G is assumed to be finite its size is not specified, so one cannot simply
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enumerate all objects of the above type, however long the time given: the only way
of understanding the axiom system is via proofs.
I wrote down the above axiom system because it has one rather interesting feature.
It is inconsistent, but the proof of this is likely to be about 3000 pages long: it is
still in the process of being written down twenty five years after it was ‘discovered’
(Solomon [1995]). Of course the group theorists working on this problem were
not thinking in such negative terms. They were trying to classify all finite simple
groups, but their conclusion can be written, if rather perversely, in the above way.
Another example of an inconsistent axiom scheme is obtained by adding to Peano
arithmetic the statement
There exist positive integers a, b, c, n all larger than 10100
such that an + bn = cn.
Once again the proof of inconsistency is horrendously difficult, and the inconsis-
tency of this extended Peano arithmetic has no implications for any results proved
in classical mathematics before 1990.
The fact that axiom schemes so similar to Peano arithmetic might require such a
long proof of their inconsistency provides a reason why we cannot be absolutely
sure of the consistency of Peano arithmetic itself. Perhaps the shortest proof
of an inconsistency in Peano arithmetic is one hundred million pages long, and
we will never discover it. If we were never led into a contradiction, would the
inconsistency matter? We could continue to prove theorems and derive interesting
interconnections between ideas without ever suspecting the awful truth.
Such a situation need not imply that our efforts were worthless. There are many
examples in the past in which contradictions in axiom systems, once pointed out,
have been rectified. The most famous was Frege’s set theory, in which Russell found
a paradox. Within twenty years the ZFC set theory removed these particular
problems, although at some cost in terms of elegance. Interesting mathematics
(certainly in the field of analysis) is remarkably tolerant of changes in the axiomatic
framework, and can also often be rescued from technical errors, possibly after
changing or increasing the number of assumptions.
7 The Quine-Putnam argument
We conclude with some brief comments about the well-known argument that the
objectivity of mathematics as a whole is guaranteed by its applications to the
physical sciences. Even if one accepts this, we have presented evidence in Davies
[2003a, 2003b] that one cannot derive the correctness of classical mathematics or
prove the continuity of space from present-day physics. Physicists know that all of
the mathematical models which they have constructed so far have only approximate
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validity, and adopt a very pragmatic and empirical attitude towards them. For
most of them proving theorems is simply not important. The shape of the final
‘theory of everything’ is entirely open, and many scientists do not believe that such
a theory exists.
It is possible to argue that group theory is imposed by us on the physical world for
our convenience, as opposed to its being a feature of the world itself. We know,
for example, that Euclidean geometry is not even approximately relevant in parts
of relativistic space-time close to black holes, but near to us it is very useful, even
though we no longer regard space and time as separable. A model constructed by
the author shows that the predictions of quantum theory are consistent with space
being discrete (Davies [2003b]); in this model the apparent, continuous, Euclidean
symmetries of space are emergent properties in the large scale limit. The physicist
R Newton put it the following way.
Conceivably, the resulting predictions could be made without using the
concepts and results of the theory of groups; at the very least, however,
to arrive at them in such a way would take enormously more time and
effort. It is not that Nature itself makes use of group theory; it is that
we humans need this invaluable mental crutch to understand Nature.
Mathematics is not embedded in the structure of reality, but we require
the help of its power to penetrate and describe that reality. (Newton
[1997, p. 141]).
There is now a vigorous mathematical theory of large cardinals, but many mathe-
maticians instinctively distrust it, and most physicists have probably never heard
of it. Gillies [[2000] goes so far as to declare that this theory makes no contact
with science and that its truths cannot be defended from an empiricist point of
view. Certainly it is hard to find anything in physics which would be affected by
the truth or falsity of the continuum hypothesis.
The Banach-Tarski paradox of 1924 states that it is possible to divide a solid
ball into six parts which may then be moved around rigidly and combined into
two balls, each the same size as the original. This physically absurd result depends
upon using the axiom of choice to produce parts which are not Lebesgue measurable
sets. Most physicists would say that it results from taking the mathematical model
too seriously. Non-measurable sets do not qualify as potentially material objects.
In addition no set which has diameter smaller than the Planck length has any
relevance to physics, because at that scale classical language is not the appropriate
way to describe physics. The obsession of mathematicians with the continuum
limit is simply not appropriate in physics, where it is accepted only because it
makes the equations simpler to write down and solve.
Acknowledgements I should like to thank D Gillies for helpful conversations.
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